### Links

#### The affirmative’s choice to ban guns for a specific group of people is part of a neoliberal scapegoating scheme that demarcates groups of people understood as “unstable” or even “evil” as the cause of the problem. Rather than examine the deeper forces of gun violence, they simply blame the individual to protect the logic of gun use in society writ large – this is a form of shutting of discussion that prevents meaningful solutions

Esposito 14 [Luigi Esposito (Luigi Esposito, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Sociology and Criminology at Barry University in Miami Shores, FL) and Laura L. Finley (Laura Finley, Ph.D. is Assistant professor of Sociology and Criminology at Barry University in Miami Shores, FL). Beyond Gun Control: Examining Neoliberalism, Pro-gun Politics and Gun Violence in the United States. Theory in Action, Vol. 7, No. 2, April (© 2014)]

Because neoliberals give ontological privilege to the individual over any notion of “society” or community, it follows that social problems are typically understood as personal matters. This neoliberal tendency is consistent with how many pro-gun/anti-gun control supporters understand gun violence. Rather than trying to address how persons who carry out gun violence do so within a specific cultural, economic, and social context that might shape their motivations to engage in such acts, there is a tendency to look for the “cause” of such behavior inside the individual actor. To be sure, members of the NRA and other pro-gun advocates do often point to violent movies and video games as factors that might encourage violent behavior. However, these arguments typically fail to take into account the wider social, economic, and cultural forces that might make people receptive to violent forms of entertainment in the first place. Further, these arguments fail to address why other developed societies, where violent video games and movies are also popular, have not experienced gun violence with nearly the same frequency or deadly results as in the U.S. More importantly, blaming gun violence on violent movies and video games implies that everything else in society is okay. Yet outside of blaming violent forms of entertainment and pointing to a lack of mental health services (which is discussed in more detail later), not much is offered in terms of addressing the social dimension of gun violence. For example, how gun violence in the U.S. might be related to the sort of apathy, social isolation, and devaluation of human life that is encouraged by the “survival of the fittest” ethos that characterizes the prevailing neoliberal market economy in this country is typically ignored. A much more common approach among many members of the NRA and other pro-gun supporters is to explain unprovoked gun violence and gun-related tragedies as the result of irresponsible gun ownership (e.g., individuals not adhering to gun safety rules, parents not ensuring that their firearms are out of the reach of their children or mentally unstable family members, etc.).8 Even more typically, particularly as it relates to mass shootings, gun violence is understood as the doing of individuals who are evil or mentally unstable. Thus, even when environmental issues are considered when trying to explain violence, these factors are typically seen by most gun supporters (and much of the mass media) as ancillary to some deep aberration or pathology within the individual. GUN VIOLENCE AND “EVIL” Explanations predicated on the idea of innately “evil” people wanting to do harm to others are quite common in the aftermath of mass shootings and other forms of gun violence. Indeed, in the aftermath of the tragedies at Newtown, Aurora, and Milwaukee, countless media commentators, local politicians, and even the president of the United States employed the word “evil” to explain these events. At the Sandy Hook vigil on December 16, 2012, for example, President Obama referred to the tragedy as an act of “unconscionable evil” (President Obama’s Speech at Prayer Vigil, 2012). A few days later, at a press conference, the NRA addressed the dangers of gun control and the need to do away with the current tendency to keep schools as “gun free zones” by declaring the following: We care about the President, so we protect him with armed Secret Service agents. Members of Congress work in offices surrounded by armed Capitol Police officers. Yet when it comes to the most beloved, innocent and vulnerable members of the American family— our children—we as a society leave them utterly defenseless, and the monsters and predators of this world know it and exploit it. That must change now! The truth is that our society is populated by an unknown number of genuine monsters—people so deranged, so evil, so possessed by voices and driven by demons that no sane person can possibly ever comprehend them. They walk among us every day. And does anybody really believe that the next Adam Lanza isn't planning his attack on a school he's already identified at this very moment? (NRA Press Release, emphasis added, 2012). The statement above presupposes a Manichean view of the world in which mass shootings are the work of “genuine monsters.” Because pure evil exists, what are needed are sane, moral agents who are willing and equipped with the proper tools (i.e., firearms) to battle evil. Guns, therefore, are the antidote to evil! Based on this sort of dualistic logic, those who support more gun controls are, whether intended or not, enablers of evil. By attributing the issue of mass shootings to individuals “possessed by voices” and “driven by demons,” this sort of argument decontextualizes gun violence and (here again) ignores or downplays the social, cultural, political, and economic forces underlying this problem. As discussed Jesse Roche (2013), the notion of “evil” as a “cause” of unnecessary gun violence is a “dead-end” that permits no further questions. Attributing gun violence to individual “evil doers” is thus a position that discourages the possibility of engaging in a fruitful dialogue and developing meaningful solutions to this problem.

#### Their focus on restricting access from “more risky people” instead of the role of the object itself as criminogenic – is the desire to criminalize people instead of social conditions.

Bovy: (Bovy, Phoebe Maltz, “It’s Time to Ban Guns. Yes, All of Them,” The New Republic, December 10, 2015//FT)

Progressives who might have been able to brush off accusations of anti-rural-white classism may have a tougher time confronting arguments about the disparate impact gun control policies can have on marginalized communities. These, however, are criticisms of certain tentative, insufficient gun control measures—the ones that would leave small-town white families with legally-acquired guns well enough alone, allowing them to shoot themselves or one another and to let their guns enter the general population. Ban Guns, meanwhile, is not discriminatory in this way. It’s not about dividing society into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ gun owners. It’s about placing gun ownership itself in the ‘bad’ category. It’s worth adding that the anti-gun position is ultimately about police not carrying guns, either. That could never happen, right? Well, certainly not if we keep on insisting on its impossibility. Ask yourself this: Is the pro-gun side concerned with how it comes across? More to the point: Does the fact that someone opposes gun control demonstrate that they’re culturally sensitive to the concerns of small-town whites, as well as deeply committed to fighting police brutality against blacks nationwide? I’m going to go with no and no on these. (The NRA exists!) On the pro-gun-control side of things, there’s far too much timidity. What’s needed to stop all gun violence is a vocal ban guns contingent. Getting bogged down in discussions of what’s feasible keeps what needs to happen—no more guns—from entering the realm of possibility. Public opinion needs to shift. The no-guns stance needs to be an identifiable place on the spectrum, embraced unapologetically, if it’s to be reckoned with.

#### The strategy of focus on individual groups is a masking tactic to ignore the massive profit motives of the gun industry, the group that is really responsible for the gun problem in America. Also, the focus on punitive punishment is part of the authoritarian neoliberal enforcement apparatus

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Third, those who seek to minimize gun violence must also avoid the neoliberal tendency to personalize this issue. Any meaningful discussion about gun violence must reject the neoliberal tendency to pathologize perpetrators as “sick” or “evil.” This tendency, of course, not only overlooks the web of social relations and meanings that propel individuals’ action but also invites a punitive approach to social problems that is discriminatory and anathema to democracy. Giroux (2013, online) explains this as follows: Neoliberalism leads to social policies structured around the criminalization of social problems and everyday life. This governing-through-crime model produces a highly authoritarian and mechanistic approach to addressing social problems that often focuses on the poor and minorities, promotes highly repressive policies, and places undue emphasis on personal security, rather than considering the larger complex of social and structural forces that fuels violence in the first place. To think of this issue more holistically, more efforts must be made—in schools, churches, families, the media, etc.— to promote a sense of community and interconnectedness. In effect, what might be needed is a shift in social logic that deviates from the neoliberal assumption that “only individuals matter.” Fourth, conversations about gun violence must begin to examine how the NRA and the gun industry benefits from neoliberalism. The public must be informed about the power of the gun industry and the NRA. We must continue to pull back the curtains and reveal that the NRA, while claiming to be a “civil rights organization,” is instead playing on racist fears to promote its agenda (Diaz, 2013). Books and reports that uncover the lucrative ties between gun manufacturers and the NRA (i.e, Diaz, 2013) and how the NRA’s lobbying efforts have helped craft pro-gun legislation that lines the industries pockets (Dreier, 2013) are imperative. Repealing legislation like the Tiahrt Amendments, which prohibits the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) from producing data about which guns are linked to particular crime scenes is another important step in allowing the public to make informed choices about guns (Diaz, 2013).

#### This creates a paradigm of criminalization. What is judged is the person themselves. This allows the CJS to impose deviancy upon certain identities – “a criminal violates the law because they are by nature a criminal.” This creates the demarcation that allows lives to be immediately suspect and contained.

**Dilts ‘6:** [Andrew Dilts, assistant professor of political theory, loyola marymount university, “Foucault and Felon Disenfranchisement”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Albuquerque, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mar 17, 2006]

First is the doubling of the offence. The specific offence is linked up with any manner of other activities that become associated with the offence. The actual offence is doubled with “… a whole series of other things that are not the offense itself but a series of forms of conduct, of ways of being that are, of course, presented in the discourse of the psychiatric expert as the cause, origin motivation, and starting point of the offense” (AB, 15). There are two important functions of this, first a shifting from action to way of being: “its function is to repeat the offense tautologically in order to register it and constitute it as an individual trait. Expert psychiatric opinion allows one to pass from action to conduct, from an offense to a way of being, and to make this way of being appear as nothing other than the offense itself, but in general form, as it were, in the individual’s conduct” (AB 16). Second, ways of being that are not crimes subsequently take on criminal character: “the function of this series of notions is to shift the level of reality of the offense, since these forms of conduct do not break the law” (AB 16). The doubling of the offenses has the effect of extending the law’s reach beyond the action that has brought the offender before the court. The actual offense is taken off the table, and in its place the biographical narrative of the individual is substituted. A series of non-offenses become the evidence of the criminal before the crime to explain the subsequent real offense. The psychiatric expert tells us, Foucault states, that “when they are asked to assess a delinquent, psychiatrists say, ‘After all, if he has stolen, it is basically because he is a thief,’” (AB 16). This odd inversion of causality (that the thief was a thief before stealing anything) is troubling because this logic does not, Foucault insists, actually explain the crime but rather explains “… the thing itself to be punished that the judicial system must bite on and get hold of” (AB 16). It is an explanation of the criminal subject, not the crime. In the end, we find the judge does not condemn an offender for the crime, but for being a criminal that already existed, in essence the role of such opinion is “to legitimize, in the form of scientific knowledge, the extension of punitive power to something that is not a breach of the law” (AB 18), namely any prior conduct of the “criminal” before the actual crime has been committed This leads Foucault to invoke the emergence of the delinquent as the second doubling that takes place. The offender becomes both the “author of the offense” and a delinquent someone characterized by criminal conduct. Recall the line in Discipline and Punish quoted above describing the delinquent as, “an individual in whom the offender of the law and the object of a scientific technique are superimposed – or almost – one upon the other” (DP 256). At this stage, while still in the grasp of the court, the accused is both a responsible subject and an object suitable for correction. This doubling occurs because Article 64 requires the expert to “determine whether a state of dementia allows us to consider the author of the action as someone who is no longer a juridical subject responsible for his actions” (AB 18). But once expert opinion is included, it turns out that this is not what actually happens at all. According to Foucault, the expert instead works to “show how the individual already resembles his crime before he has committed it” (AB 19). Obviously related to the first doubling, in which past actions that are possibly deviant or improper but not themselves illegal become evidence of the pre-existing criminality of the offender, the offender is revealed to have already been a criminal long before being brought before the court. The purpose is not to demonstrate merely “potential criminality” but rather, “… of describing his delinquent character, the basis of his criminal or paracriminal conduct since childhood, is clearly to facilitate transition from being accused to being convicted” (AB 22). The judge is thus able to see the offender not as a subject characterized by free agency, responsible for a specific criminal offense, but as a determinate object characterized by need for the penitentiary technique. “Magistrates and jurors no longer face a legal subject,” Foucault writes, “but an object: the object of a technology and knowledge of rectification, readaptation, reinsertion, and correction. In short, the function of the expert opinion is to double the author of the crime, whether responsible or not, with a delinquent who is the object of a specific technology” (AB 21). This is the precisely the condition of possibility that connects the juridical discourse and the penitentiary discourse described in Discipline and Punish. Legal subjects responsible for a specific transgression call for punishment in a purely retributive sense, in relation only to the criminal action. But delinquents, as a class of dangerous persons, must be handled differently, as the object of the penitentiary techniques.

#### Could add some arg about how this obscures how crime is criminogenic and is what allows us to ignore poor black communities, etc. (Some root cause claim)

### Alt/CP

#### Any solution must examine and challenge corporate power wrapped up in gun control in the first place. Thus,

#### Text: The USFG should vest the Department of the Treasury with the authority to apply federal health and safety regulations to gun sale, manufacture, and distribution – this would lead to a handgun ban and buyback program. Solves the entire case

Violence Policy Center 2000 [The Violence Policy Center is a national non-profit educational foundation that conducts research on violence in America and works to develop violence-reduction policies and proposals. The Center examines the role of firearms in America, conducts research on firearms violence, and explores new ways to decrease firearm-related death and injury. “Unsafe in Any Hands: Why America Needs to Ban Handguns” 2000. http://www.vpc.org/studies/unsafe.htm]

Why has more than 30 years of federal gun control legislation failed to slow the carnage? This is in large measure due to the ad hoc nature in which gun control legislation has been enacted often in response to specific acts of violence. Effective legislation must take into account the following— Most victims know their killers and are often related to them. Criminals often get their guns through gun stores and are skilled in evading point-of-purchase legal roadblocks. The secondary gun market—i.e.,the selling of guns at gun shows or over the Internet—is in reality totally unregulated. It is the self-defense handgun purchased by "law-abiding" citizens that ends up being used in most handgun violence. Politicians and gun control advocates alike, however, have a tendency to proffer the same legislative remedies over and over ("licensing and registration" or "background checks") without consideration of these fundamentals or inquiry into the actual effects such laws might have on reducing firearms violence overall. A contrasting legislative approach to curtailing gun violence begins with the recognition that the firearms industry remains the last unregulated manufacturer of a consumer product. Guns are the only consumer product in America specifically exempted from federal health and safety requirements. The firearms industry maintains this regulatory immunity despite the fact that their products kill more Americans every year than all household and recreational products combined. To end this era of national denial, Congress should vest the Department of the Treasury with strong authority to regulate the design, manufacture, and distribution of firearms. Such authority should include the ability to remove from the market firearms that pose a serious threat to public health and safety. In every other part of the consumer economy we have long recognized that the damage wrought by some products can be controlled only by an unequivocal ban. Products such as three-wheel ATVs and lawn darts had related death rates microscopic in comparison to handguns, but were nevertheless banned. Also, under federal regulation, products ranging from cribs to automobiles have undergone major structural alterations to minimize inherent dangers. Firearms and particularly handguns are long overdue to receive the same regulatory scrutiny. If a handgun ban were enacted, what should be done about the existing supply of some 65 million civilian-owned handguns? Could the nation afford to eliminate them through a program? Since many handguns began as cheap "junk guns," a generous estimate of the average buy-back price would be $250. The total tab would be about $16.25 billion, which is slightly more than three SSN-21 nuclear attack submarines.44 Considering that by conservative estimates America spends $4 billion annually on medical care for gun violence victims, the cost of a buy-back could be recouped in a few years. A clear-cut plan to ban handguns should be developed and implemented soon. Considering the many thousands who are killed or maimed by the handgun each year, how much more motivation do we need?

#### Mutually exclusive – the PIC uses a separate enforcement mechanism than the aff by banning handguns commercially for public health reasons. Individuals would not go to jail under the buy-back program since manufacturers and companies would be the ones held responsible. It’s like any other health and safety regulation – the CP is designed to protect consumers and individuals

#### The counterplan shifts the focus back onto companies – solves my harms but the perm fails due to the links

Stitton 94 [Lea Sitton, INQUIRER STAFF WRITER “Regulating Guns As Consumer Product Gains Backers” Philadelphia Inquirer. April 28, 1994 http://articles.philly.com/1994-04-28/news/25861953\_1\_gun-makers-gun-control-josh-sugarmann]

A dozen years ago, public health professor Stephen P. Teret was called a communist for saying that cars should have air bags. Now, cars have air bags - and auto makers, who once battled the safety feature as too costly, brag about them in advertising. These days Teret and others are pushing another radical idea: Instead of concentrating on gun control, try regulating firearms, just like teddy bears, or aspirin, or any other consumer product. As researchers predict that, by the year 2003, the gun will overtake the car as America's most deadly consumer product, the proposal - part of a movement to treat violence as a public health issue - is gaining attention. If the gun were treated as a consumer product, that is, as a plain tool - instead of as a symbol of crime or an inalienable right - then the country could break free of what has become an ineffectual, emotional debate over gun control, Teret and others argue. "Why have we been fooled so long by looking at the person who pulls the trigger and not the person who makes the trigger?" asked Teret, who heads the public health division in the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health in Baltimore. If gun makers were treated like car makers, or like the makers of pesticides or teddy bears, they might be required to: \* Childproof the product. \* Install safety features, such as an indicator that would show at a glance whether the weapon was loaded. \* "Personalize" the product, so it could be fired only by the authorized user. A combination lock would be a low-tech way. At the high-tech end, a palm-print activation design has been suggested. \* Stop making a particular firearm if its risks were found to outweigh its benefits. \* Adhere to truth-in-advertising rules. Furthermore, if a gun were seen as a dangerous machine, its user could be required to: \* Pass a safety course. \* Be licensed to use it. \* Register it. \* Store it out of children's reach. Also, firearms merchants - as dealers in a dangerous consumer product - would face tougher regulation than they now do. And buyers likely would have to undergo more rigorous background checks and waiting periods, as well as face a limit on the number of guns they could buy in, say, a month. The notion of guns as a consumer product seems an obvious one. They are produced and marketed. When sales slumped in the '80s, manufacturers expanded their product lines and made technological improvements, such as adding laser sights. They also developed new advertising campaigns, and tapped into another market: women. "There's an industry," said Josh Sugarmann of the Violence Policy Center, which this year produced model legislation to regulate the manufacture, distribution and sale of firearms and ammunition. "It has a marketing plan. It reacts as any other industry." However, Sugarmann said, the way Americans have historically viewed the gun makes it difficult for them to see it as a consumer product. "It's the fact that they are designed to kill," he said. Also, people see gun ownership as a right. "To say that a gun is a dangerous toaster is to denigrate them," Sugarmann added. As for people in the gun industry, they see guns as a product that works. The gun-injury problem is "a responsibility issue," said Ken Jorgensen, a spokesman for Smith & Wesson, the nation's largest handgun manufacturer. "A handgun is designed to shoot a projectile. . . . Handguns do what they're supposed to do," he said. But Teret responded: "Even if you accept that a gun is supposed to discharge a lethal force . . . that's not to say you can't control the circumstances under which it discharges that lethal force. . . . That doesn't mean that they have to discharge a bullet when one 14-year-old is angry at another 14-year-old." Jorgensen, of Smith & Wesson, sounding like car makers of the past, dismissed the idea of personalizing firearms. Low-tech safety features would be cumbersome, he said. And requiring manufacturers to install high-tech safety features would price the product out of the average gun owner's reach. But those who argue that the focus of the gun debate should be on the shooter - or the adult who left the gun lying around - may be losing ground in Washington. The product-safety argument is "the future of the debate on firearms," said Tom Hill, a spokesman for the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. "The White House is interested. People on the Hill are interested. . . . Everything is regulated, from teddy bears on up. Guns aren't," Hill said. Marian Wright Edelman, president of the Children's Defense Fund, testified at a Senate subcomittee hearing last month that "firearms are virtually the only unregulated dangerous consumer product in the United States." Their voices are rising with the number of product injuries and with reports of shootings involving children. In Norristown last Tuesday, a 13-year-old boy shot a 12-year-old girl with a .25-caliber handgun from a school bus window, authorities said. That same day in Philadelphia, a 16-year-old girl was fatally shot by her 15-year-old boyfriend while he handled a .38-caliber revolver, police said. And Monday, a 16-year-old boy playing basketball on a city playground was killed by a bullet intended for someone else. "What we really have now is a problem of children killing children," said Mark L. Rosenberg of the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC statistics show that more teenagers die from firearm injuries than from all diseases combined. Since 1985, the risk of dying from a gun injury has grown 77 percent for youths ages 15 to 19. "Young people and guns are really central to this explosion of violence," Rosenberg said. In addition to stressing the youth crisis, advocates of the consumer- product approach to guns say research belies the national obsession with crime and guns. For example, CDC figures show that most gun deaths are suicides - not homicides - and suicide rates are rising. Furthermore, the suicide risk is nearly five times greater for households with firearms than for those without them, the CDC reports. "Those statistics are largely fabricated," responded Richard Gardiner, a spokesman for the National Rifle Association. Besides, suicides are "intentional, willful acts," Gardiner said, expressing a commonly held view. Dr. Jerry Kaplan of Hahnemann University Medical Center, who has studied youth suicide, said there are "many, many, many reasons" given for the increase in suicides, including the availability of firearms. But "guns made completion much, much better," he said. "A gun is a horrible thing in the hands of a suicidal person because it is so damned effective," Kaplan said. The shift in the gun debate began in Teret's living room about a decade ago, he said. Teret and student Garen J. Wintemute, now an emergency room physician and an associate professor at the University of California, Davis, were brainstorming: What had been overlooked in the battle over guns? The manufacturer. The notion was not an instant hit. The best reaction then was "people would just politely ignore you, and it went steadily downhill from there," Teret said. But these days, Teret has the ear of legislators. Recently, one senator active in the gun debate, Ohio Democrat Howard M. Metzenbaum, asked Teret to respond to questions about how guns might be brought into a regulatory framework similar to those of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. Metzenbaum is sponsoring a gun-control bill dubbed "Brady 2," which moves in the consumer-product direction. The bill - the Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994: Public Health and Child Safety - aims to treat "guns and gun owners much in the same way we treat cars and car owners," said Susan Whitmore, a spokeswoman for Handgun Control Inc., which is chaired by Sarah Brady. Under Brady 2, manufacturers would have to childproof handguns. Anyone buying a handgun would have to hold a state license. Similar to a driver's license, it would be issued only after a background check and the completion of a firearms safety course. The bill also calls for tighter regulation of gun dealers. Semiautomatic assault weapons and other weapons with no apparent sporting use would be banned. Sugarmann said Brady 2 was a step in the right direction, adding that shifting the focus of the gun debate in Washington would come little by little. "We're not naive enough to think the Hill's going to go, 'Hallelujah! The answer is here. Let's go with it tomorrow,' " Sugarmann said. Sugarmann sent legislators copies of the study done this year by his Violence Policy Center titled Cease Fire: A Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Firearms Violence. The study includes a 20-page model bill designed "to protect the public against unreasonable risk of injury and death associated with firearms and related products." The bill would result in a handgun ban, Sugarmann said, because handguns would fail risk-and-benefit standards. According to researchers, handguns account for 25 to 30 percent of all firearms in American homes, but about 75 percent of all firearm deaths and injuries. The issue, Sugarmann said, is: "Does the harm done by the product outweigh the benefit? . . . Handguns are the DDT of firearms." Teret does not talk about bans, saying only, "There are some guns that no one should have, and some people should have no guns." As for the consumer-product approach, he said, "It won't make bad people good. . . . But it will mean when people get angry, there won't be a dead person lying on the ground."

### Potential F/W cards

### Framework

#### Their framework undermines debate about assumptions underlying policy and teaches us to not defend the process by which we make our conclusions - even if we don’t win our alternative is perfect, our imagination of a post-neoliberal future is revolutionary.

Gunder et al. 09 – senior planning lecturer at the Aukland University [Michael. “Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning”. Pg. 11-12.]

* Process as important as policies

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes their desired enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In tum, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy. Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues. Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their "˜dominant stakeholders` can ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and Hillier 2007a, 469).

The current post-democratic` milieu facilitates the above through avoidance of critical policy debate challenging favored orthodox positions and policy approaches. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative solutions, are eradicated from political debate so that while token institutions of liberal democracy' are retained conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003, 59). Consequently, the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are repeatedly used or their work drawn upon by different stakeholders, while more critical voices are silenced by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007, 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox "successful” or "best practice” economic development or spatial planning responses. This further maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo while providing "˜a cover and shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the political held from any research that is independent and radical in its conception as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time, adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses for every competing local area or city-region, largely resulting in a zero-sum game (Blair and Kumar 1997).

#### The affirmative authors dogmatically view the world from the point of the dominant but flawed ontology. The aff’s so called “intellectuals” jobs depend on them representing capital as benevolent and inevitable. Their framework is an attempt to make the debate space a training ground for a new generation passive participants in the neoliberal world order.

Lambie, 10 – Ph.D., joint-editor of the International Journal of Cuban Studies, and Lecturer in Public Policy at De Montfort University (George Lambie, “The Cuban Revolution in the 21st Century”, Pluto Press, pg. 150-152)

It is interesting that when most academics analyse revolutions and transformative processes, they focus almost exclusively on leaders. In turn, they seek to interpret the ideas and actions of these prominent figures based on the influence of other elites. These factors are important, but must be recognised as only partial explanations for most instances of significant socio-economic change. The issue of the role of intellectuals in society, and exactly what constitutes intellectual formation, is a complex debate (Lambie 2000). However, on the specific issue of academic approaches to leaders, the difficulty lies ultimately in the ideological composition of the academics themselves, which is rooted in the dominant ontology, one that emphasises individualism, elite leadership and an immutable order of human nature. Given this perspective, it is difficult to imagine a set of ideas or a consciousness emerging out of what seems to be thin air. From the ridicule of Marx’s observations on the autonomy of workers in the Paris Commune, to contemporary views that see socialism as utopian, there is an ideological intolerance of any idea that defies the implicit ontological parameters of liberalism.

When the dominant liberal interpretive framework does encounter what appears to be spontaneous action and organisation at the grassroots level, it sees this in terms of civil society freeing itself from the state, and as an expression of self-help. This view is theorised in Hernando de Soto’s work The Other Path (1989), which interprets the survival strategies of the poor in developing countries as a blossoming of individual initiative. A similar ideological perspective permeates much of the NGO philosophy, with its emphasis on micro-credit and market-orientated initiatives to resolve problems in civil society without the involvement of the state. This kind of thinking also informs much of the policy-driven theory that dominates sections of academia in Western countries. For instance, as procedural democracies such as the UK struggle to deal with the ‘democratic deficit’, and governments become concerned about political legitimacy, policies are devised to enhance ‘participation’ and ‘citizenship’ in an attempt to give substance to liberal hegemony. Lack of ‘participation’ or understanding of ‘citizenship’ is seen as an educational issue, and citizens have to be instructed and ‘enabled’ by policy makers and academics to realise their ‘democratic’ rights. At its core, this is nothing more than a thinly concealed indoctrina- tion exercise to impose the rule of the market onto the organisation of local structures. Commenting on the role of academics and intellectuals in general, Wayne (2003:23–24) points out:

One way in which intellectuals have attempted to explain their social role has been to depoliticise what it means to be elaborators and disseminators of ideas. This involves uncoupling knowledge production from vested social interests, defining professionalism as rising above the social conflict between capital and labour, and instead promoting ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ as the very essence of what it is that intellectuals do ... the ideology of ‘objectivity’ has, under the guise of working for all humanity, justified their role to capitalists ...

This attitude concerning the role of academics and intellectuals was famously defended by the French writer Romain Roland after the First World War, in his work Au-dessus de la mêlée (‘Above the Battle’) (1915). Roland’s position may be justified if one argues that the shock and horror of war temporarily divested life of meaning in the minds of rational people, and retreat into the ivory tower became a mode of defence against this malaise. However, modern intellectuals have no such excuse, and have increasingly become apparatchiks of a knowledge-production system that is driven by money, career climbing and prestige, all of which can be attained through conformity.

Ultimately, only by grasping the idea that human nature is not immutable can one transcend these intellectual limitations and imagine the unimaginable. Martí, Guevara, Castro and other Cuban leaders understood this intellectually and intuitively, both by participating in the historical process themselves, and by not losing touch with the masses. Of course, the Cuban political process has fluctuated in the emphasis it has given to leadership or to participation, but the two have interacted more fully and more continuously than has been seen in any other country.

#### Their framework crowds out deliberation and turns decision making. Focusing solely on implementation cannot effectively challenge neoliberalism; analysis is key.

Adaman and Madra 12 – Adaman: economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul; Madra: has a PhD from University of Massachusetts Amherst, and is an economics professor [Fikret and Yahya. “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/bou/wpaper/2012-04.html>.]

States as agents of economization

Neoliberal reason is therefore not simply about market expansion and the withdrawal of the welfare state, but more broadly about reconfiguring the state and its functions so that the state governs its subjects through a filter of economic incentives rather than direct coercion. In other words, supposed subjects of the neoliberal state are not citizen-subjects with political and social rights, but rather economic subjects who are supposed to comprehend (hence, calculative) and respond predictably (hence, calculable) to economic incentives (and disincentives). There are mainly two ways in which states under the sway of neoliberal reason aim to manipulate the conduct of their subjects. The first is through markets, or market-like incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms that economic experts design based on the behaviorist assumption that economic agents respond predictably to economic (but not necessarily pecuniary) incentives, to achieve certain discrete objectives. The second involves a revision of the way the bureaucracy functions. Here, the neoliberal reason functions as an internal critique of the way bureaucratic dispositifs organize themselves: The typical modus operandi of this critique is to submit the bureaucracy to efficiency audits and subsequently advocate the subcontracting of various functions of the state to the private sector either by fullblown privatization or by public-private partnerships.

While in the first case citizen-subjects are treated solely as economic beings, in the second case the state is conceived as an enterprise, i.e., a production unit, an economic agency whose functions are persistently submitted to various forms of economic auditing, thereby suppressing all other (social, political, ecological) priorities through a permanent economic criticism. Subcontracting, public-private partnerships, and privatization are all different mechanisms through which contemporary governments embrace the discourses and practices of contemporary multinational corporations. In either case, however, economic policy decisions (whether they involve macroeconomic or microeconomic matters) are isolated from public debate and deliberation, and treated as matters of technocratic design and implementation, while regulation, to the extent it is warranted, is mostly conducted by experts outside political life—the so-called independent regulatory agencies. In the process, democratic participation in decision-making is either limited to an already highly-commodified, spectacularized, mediatized electoral politics, or to the calculus of opinion polls where consumer discontent can be managed through public relations experts. As a result, a highly reductionist notion of economic efficiency ends up being the only criteria with which to measure the success or failure of such decisions. Meanwhile, individuals with financial means are free to provide support to those in need through charity organizations or corporations via their social responsibility channels.

Here, two related caveats should be noted to sharpen the central thrust of the argument proposed in this chapter. First, the separation of the economic sphere from the social-ecological whole is not an ontological given, but rather a political project. By treating social subjectivity solely in economic terms and deliberately trying to insulate policy-making from popular politics and democratic participation, the neoliberal project of economization makes a political choice. Since there are no economic decisions without a multitude of complex and over-determined social consequences, the attempt to block (through economization) all political modes of dissent, objection and negotiation available (e.g., “voice”) to those who are affected from the said economic decisions is itself a political choice. In short, economization is itself a political project.

Yet, this drive towards technocratization and economization—which constitutes the second caveat—does not mean that the dirty and messy distortions of politics are gradually being removed from policy-making. On the contrary, to the extent that policy making is being insulated from popular and democratic control, it becomes exposed to the “distortions” of a politics of rent-seeking and speculation—ironically, as predicted by the representatives of the Virginia School. Most public-private partnerships are hammered behind closed doors of a bureaucracy where states and multinational corporations divide the economic rent among themselves. The growing concentration of capital at the global scale gives various industries (armament, chemical, health care, petroleum, etc.—see, e.g., Klein, 2008) enormous amount of leverage over the governments (especially the developing ones). It is extremely important, however, to note that this tendency toward rent-seeking is not a perversion of the neoliberal reason. For much of neoliberal theory (in particular, for the Austrian and the Chicago schools), private monopolies and other forms of concentration of capital are preferred to government control and ownership. And furthermore, for some (such as the Virginia and the Chicago schools), rent-seeking is a natural implication of the “opportunism” of human beings, even though neoliberal thinkers disagree whether rent-seeking is essentially economically efficient (as in “capture” theories of the Chicago school imply) or inefficient (as in rent-seeking theories of the Virginia school imply) (Madra and Adaman, 2010).

This reconfiguration of the way modern states in advanced capitalist social formations govern the social manifests itself in all domains of public and social policy-making. From education to health, and employment to insurance, there is an observable shift from rights-based policymaking forged through public deliberation and participation, to policy-making based solely on economic viability where policy issues are treated as matters of technocratic calculation. In this regard, as noted above, the treatment of subjectivity solely in behaviorist terms of economic incentives functions as the key conceptual choice that makes the technocratization of public policy possible. Neoliberal thinking and practices certainly have a significant impact on the ecology. The next section will focus on the different means through which various forms of neoliberal governmentality propose and actualize the economization of the ecology.

#### The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the knowledge production of the affirmative is valid – our role as intellectuals is to expose and derail hegemonic power structures.

**Jones 99:** [Richard, IR, Aberystwyth, “6. Emancipation: Reconceptualizing Practice,” Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html]

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. **This** task **is accomplished through educational activity**, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of thex “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual–moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332–333) According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual–moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolò Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtù–ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern prince could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125–205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict. 1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security–related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short–term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse–Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse–Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectual communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center–left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52–54; Risse–Kappen 1994: 196–200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse–Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse–Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard–liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse–Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90–110) Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and **intellectuals** persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least **have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior.** The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East–West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse–Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin, and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse–Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East–West relations in order to facilitate much–needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223–260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonstrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution of society. Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’état the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full–square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self–consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures—**can become “a force for the direction of action**.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323–377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, half man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and through which ruling or dominant ideas become widely dispersed. 2 In particular, Gramsci describes how ideology becomes sedimented in society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. **Obviously**, for Gramsci, **there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change.** In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well–worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229–239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive **social change requires** a slow, **incremental**, even **molecular, struggle** to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. **This** in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. The Tasks of Critical Security Studies If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of a war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking **about security** behind its positivist facade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116–121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing a part in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant punditry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture.... As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponents of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also Cortright 1993: 5–13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naive to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49–62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk–averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

### Criminogenics K

#### The affirmative’s reliance on past convictions as a metric for criminogenics drives the prison-rehabilitative complex – by constructing those with alcohol convictions as inherently more likely to commit crime, we pave the way for the biopolitical apparatus to not only take control of that offender’s life, but also to affirm its own warped necessity.

**Dilts ‘6:** [Andrew Dilts, assistant professor of political theory, loyola marymount university, “Foucault and Felon Disenfranchisement”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Albuquerque, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mar 17, 2006]

Foucault states, “The penitentiary technique and the delinquent are in a sense twin brothers” (DP 255). The delinquent, it turns out, was not revealed as some kind of objectively real thing, “that the abstraction and rigidity of the law were unable to perceive” (DP 255), but was fabricated by the very institution that operates upon it. The one does not precede the other, but rather, “They appeared together, the one extending from the other, as a technological ensemble that forms and fragments the object to which it applies its instruments” (DP 255). The prison and the delinquent might be logically distinct (they are clearly not synonymous), but they rely upon each other completely for questions of meaning and justification. While the prison form and its technique of power comes into existence historically as a response to products of the judicial system (convicted criminals) 5 , it maintains and gives meaning to itself through the careful production and maintenance of the delinquent as its object. In this section, I will trace Foucault’s presentation of the linkage between the penitentiary technique and the delinquent to show what is meant by the fabrication of this “curious substitution” of the delinquent for the criminal. Foucault first mentions the delinquent in Discipline and Punish, writing: [F]rom the hands of justice, [the penitentiary apparatus] certainly receives a convicted person; but what it must apply itself to is not, of course, the offence, nor even exactly the offender, but a rather different object, one defined by variables which at the outset at least were not taken into account in the sentence, for they were relevant only for a corrective technology. This other character, whom the penitentiary apparatus substitutes for the convicted offender, is the delinquent (DP 251). The prison, as a system of techniques of disciplinary power, looks backwards towards a previously established subject of the “convicted offender”, a person proven guilty of a specific crime, and takes this person as its object only initially. 6 The penitentiary cannot logically operate upon the crime, but must operate upon an individual that is simultaneously responsible for that crime and a kind that can be rehabilitated. The prison needs an individual that sits somewhere between the past and the future, a subject that bears the punishment for the bad act but also demands, by virtue of its entire character, an object to be re-shaped for the future. The delinquent is, he argues, “fabricated” precisely in order for there to be a fitting object of the corrective, forward-looking project of the penitentiary system and is substituted for the convicted offender. Foucault distinguishes between the convicted offender and delinquent in two domains, first in reference to the institution that establishes them, second in their relation to the criminal act. The offender is a product of the penal justice system, whereas the delinquent is the product of the prison. He writes, “The correlative of penal justice may well be the offender, but the correlative of the penitentiary apparatus is someone other; this is the delinquent, a biographical unity, a kernel of danger, representing a type of anomaly” (DP 254). The prison receives the convicted person “from the hands of justice,” but the prison “substitutes” the delinquent for this offender. It appears, at least in Discipline and Punish, that Foucault implies a distinct border between the juridical discourse and the punitive discourse. We will see later, however, that this border importantly permeable. Neither discourse has complete authority over one or the other character.

#### The offense is taken off the table and instead what is judged is the criminal themselves. Personal judgements lend themselves to abuse and allow the CJS to impose deviancy upon certain bodies. A criminal violates the law because they are by nature a criminal. The law immediately presumes such bodies are suspect to deviancy and violence and as such they must be contained – destroys value to life [lol just for fun].

**Dilts ‘6:** [Andrew Dilts, assistant professor of political theory, loyola marymount university, “Foucault and Felon Disenfranchisement”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Albuquerque, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mar 17, 2006]

First is the doubling of the offence. The specific offence is linked up with any manner of other activities that become associated with the offence. The actual offence is doubled with “… a whole series of other things that are not the offense itself but a series of forms of conduct, of ways of being that are, of course, presented in the discourse of the psychiatric expert as the cause, origin motivation, and starting point of the offense” (AB, 15). There are two important functions of this, first a shifting from action to way of being: “its function is to repeat the offense tautologically in order to register it and constitute it as an individual trait. Expert psychiatric opinion allows one to pass from action to conduct, from an offense to a way of being, and to make this way of being appear as nothing other than the offense itself, but in general form, as it were, in the individual’s conduct” (AB 16). Second, ways of being that are not crimes subsequently take on criminal character: “the function of this series of notions is to shift the level of reality of the offense, since these forms of conduct do not break the law” (AB 16). The doubling of the offenses has the effect of extending the law’s reach beyond the action that has brought the offender before the court. The actual offense is taken off the table, and in its place the biographical narrative of the individual is substituted. A series of non-offenses become the evidence of the criminal before the crime to explain the subsequent real offense. The psychiatric expert tells us, Foucault states, that “when they are asked to assess a delinquent, psychiatrists say, ‘After all, if he has stolen, it is basically because he is a thief,’” (AB 16). This odd inversion of causality (that the thief was a thief before stealing anything) is troubling because this logic does not, Foucault insists, actually explain the crime but rather explains “… the thing itself to be punished that the judicial system must bite on and get hold of” (AB 16). It is an explanation of the criminal subject, not the crime. In the end, we find the judge does not condemn an offender for the crime, but for being a criminal that already existed, in essence the role of such opinion is “to legitimize, in the form of scientific knowledge, the extension of punitive power to something that is not a breach of the law” (AB 18), namely any prior conduct of the “criminal” before the actual crime has been committed This leads Foucault to invoke the emergence of the delinquent as the second doubling that takes place. The offender becomes both the “author of the offense” and a delinquent someone characterized by criminal conduct. Recall the line in Discipline and Punish quoted above describing the delinquent as, “an individual in whom the offender of the law and the object of a scientific technique are superimposed – or almost – one upon the other” (DP 256). At this stage, while still in the grasp of the court, the accused is both a responsible subject and an object suitable for correction. This doubling occurs because Article 64 requires the expert to “determine whether a state of dementia allows us to consider the author of the action as someone who is no longer a juridical subject responsible for his actions” (AB 18). But once expert opinion is included, it turns out that this is not what actually happens at all. According to Foucault, the expert instead works to “show how the individual already resembles his crime before he has committed it” (AB 19). Obviously related to the first doubling, in which past actions that are possibly deviant or improper but not themselves illegal become evidence of the pre-existing criminality of the offender, the offender is revealed to have already been a criminal long before being brought before the court. The purpose is not to demonstrate merely “potential criminality” but rather, “… of describing his delinquent character, the basis of his criminal or paracriminal conduct since childhood, is clearly to facilitate transition from being accused to being convicted” (AB 22). The judge is thus able to see the offender not as a subject characterized by free agency, responsible for a specific criminal offense, but as a determinate object characterized by need for the penitentiary technique. “Magistrates and jurors no longer face a legal subject,” Foucault writes, “but an object: the object of a technology and knowledge of rectification, readaptation, reinsertion, and correction. In short, the function of the expert opinion is to double the author of the crime, whether responsible or not, with a delinquent who is the object of a specific technology” (AB 21). This is the precisely the condition of possibility that connects the juridical discourse and the penitentiary discourse described in Discipline and Punish. Legal subjects responsible for a specific transgression call for punishment in a purely retributive sense, in relation only to the criminal action. But delinquents, as a class of dangerous persons, must be handled differently, as the object of the penitentiary techniques.

#### This form of necro-political control is what grants the state power over the bodies of deviant populations – the creation of delinquency in prisons establishes a population over which the state has unchecked control to exercise violent exclusion.

**Gledhill ’94:** [John Gledhill; Professor at the university of Essex. Power & Its Disguises (Pluto Press) 1994 , P. 30-31]

The issues raised in Discipline and Punish mark a turning point in Foucault's understanding of power in the past four centuries of the history of Western society. They draw our attention to the emergence of a whole series of discourses designed to construct programmes for reshaping society. Foucault distinguishes between what he terms 'strategies', 'technologies' and 'programmes' of power. Programmes of power define a domain of social reality to be turned into an object of rational knowledge, intervened in and made functional. Tech¬nologies of power are techniques and practices for the disciplining, surveillance, administration and shaping of human individuals. Programmes define forms of knowledge and discourses about objects of knowledge. Technologies are apparatuses of power designed to implement that knowledge. Strategies of power are what agencies do in practice in exercising power and in operationalizing programmes and technologies. They develop in response to changing circum¬stances and are therefore improvisations. Furthermore, the field of strategies also includes strategies of resistance. Foucault sees power relations as present in all social relationships, permeating society in a capillary way rather than coming 'down' from a single centre of control such as the state. He therefore provides another argument against giving politically organized resistance analytical priority over individual strategies which counter specific forms of domination, even in minute, everyday ways. It is of vital importance that programmes of power elaborated in discourses must be implemented through technologies which encounter the recalcitrant material of real societies and real people. Their practical effects are determined by strategies (of domination and resistance). Foucault points out that prisons, for example, totally fail to fulfill what was the programme, the elimination of crime and the reform of the criminal: the prison, apparently 'failing', does not miss its target; on the contrary, it reaches it, in so far as it gives rise to one particular form of illegality in the midst of others, which it is able to isolate, to place in full light and to organize as a relatively enclosed, but penetrable, milieu. It helps to establish an open illegality, irreducible at a certain level, but secretly useful, at once refractory, but docile ... This form is ... delinquency ... So successful has the prison been that, after half a century of 'failures' the prison still exists, producing the same results, and there is the greatest possible reluctance to dispense with it. (Foucault 1979: 276-7). The context of these seemingly bizarre remarks is the pattern of popular 'illegalities' in the nineteenth century. There was not merely an increase in crime, linked to the social transformations of industrial urbanization, but the European elites saw this illegality as politically threatening. The lower orders were seen as essentially criminal and barbaric. The prison's 'fabrication' of delinquency offered a number of advantages: individual members of the barbarous classes could be identified, and perhaps turned into informers. In place of the vagabonds roaming the countryside in the eighteenth century, ready to form 'formidable forces for rioting and looting', those classified as 'delinquents' were a controllable group, now pushed to the social margins, unable to unite with other sections of society, and locked into a life of petty crimes of which the poorer classes were most likely to be victims. Those branded delinquents were thus isolated from participation in other 'popular illegalities' which might turn 'political'. Delin¬quents were often used to spy on workers' organizations (ibid.: 280). Delinquency as a 'controlled illegality' could even be profitable for the dominant groups in society. Prostitution in nineteenth-century France was turned into a domain of surveillance, with checks by the police and checks on the prostitutes' health. Brothels were organized into hierarchic networks and delinquent-informers served as inter¬mediaries between officialdom and this subterranean world. Public moralization made consorting with prostitutes a more clandestine and expensive activity, increasing the profits of what legal and moral prohibition had turned into big business. Foucault concludes that: 'in setting up a price for pleasure, in creating a profit from repressed sexuality, and in collecting this profit, the delinquent milieu was in complicity with a self-interested Puritanism: an illicit fiscal agent operating over illegal practices' (ibid.). The prison failed by the criteria of its original programme and the discourse which gave birth to it, but proved a success in terms of other, improvised, strategies of power.